CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LIMITS OF THE
POSSIBLE
JEDEDIAH PURDY †
Climate change looks to be more than just another
environmental problem. It threatens to test the limits of our
dominant ways of understanding and solving, not just environmental
1
problems, but problems of political economy generally. Climate
change has distinctive temporal and spatial features – how long it
takes to unfold and the ways in which its effects are distributed across
the globe – which may outstrip the capacity of our basic principles of
economic and political decision-making. If so, then understanding
the issue in a static way may ensure that we expect to fail in
addressing it and are inarticulate about our prospects for success.
That is, if we assume that economic and political decisions reflect the
present distribution of self-interest within the existing structure of
rules and institutions, we may be unable to see our way beyond the
problem, because it so neatly frustrates the problem-solving power of
our current arrangements. We may need, instead, to adopt a dynamic
view of political economy.

† Associate Professor of Law, Duke University Law School. J.D., Yale Law School,
A.B., Harvard College. I thank Jonathan Wiener, my co-teacher in a course on Climate Change
and the Law, and students in that class for helpful and insightful conversation about this issue.
1. “Political economy” is an important term here. I use it to refer to economic activity,
not as a domain of independent, quasi-natural principles (for instance, decisions based on
microeconomic rationality aggregating predictably into institutional arrangements which
advance the interests of the participants), but as a domain that interacts dynamically with
political institutions and decisions. In my sense of political economy, while economic activity
has a logic and power of its own, it is also a creature of political decisions such as the definition
and assignment of property rights and the terms of regulation. This meaning is different from
some contemporary uses, which treat it as a catchword for public-choice analysis of political
decisions, in effect reducing politics to an extension of microeconomic rationality. It would have
been familiar to nineteenth- and early twentieth-century students of economics and political
institutions. See, e.g., ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF
PRIVATE GOVERNING POWER 3-44, 385-99 (1952) (diagnosing private economic rights as
creatures of public law and enforcement); JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY 209-44 (1994) (exploring government’s definition of economic rights as an
instrument of production and distribution), 727-33 (on the role of state in economic life,
generally) (Prometheus Books 2004) (1848).
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A dynamic view of political economy has certain core features.
First, it assumes that the interests that actors pursue in politics are
sometimes endogenous to politics itself. That is, politics is not only a
vehicle for pursuit of interests that pre-exist and stand apart from
political contest.
Sometimes it is also the source of new
understandings of the relevant interests of the actors involved. The
deliberation, struggle, and problem-solving of politics can change how
2
those who participate understand and experience their own motives.
Second, a dynamic view assumes that interests also may be
endogenous to economic activity. That is, the characteristic decisions
and transactions of economic life may influence how participants
3
understand their own motives in that activity. In a dynamic view,
then, economic and political life has a double character. On the one
hand, it centrally involves what static analysis concentrates on: pursuit
of existing interests through existing rules and institutions. On the
other hand, however, it also involves the dynamic activity of reexamining, newly discovering, or otherwise changing the relevant
interests.
Third, a dynamic view assumes a feedback relationship between
understandings of interests and institutional design. Thus a feature of
political economy in a dynamic view is that actors try to institute
arrangements that reinforce their current view of relevant interests,
and the arrangements that arise, in turn, shape the motives of the
future. The politics of institutional design, then, is not only about
what we can get; it is also about what we value, and about the
institutional context in which we will reach our next set of judgments
about what we value.
What I am calling a dynamic analysis is not the same as “taking
values seriously” as distinct from “crasser” interests or inarticulate
4
preferences. A static analysis can perfectly well acknowledge that
2. See AMARTYA SEN, Goals, Commitment, and Identity, in RATIONALITY AND
FREEDOM 206, 206-24 (2002) (on deliberation and reflection as essential to an adequate view
even of economic decision-making); AMARTYA SEN, Environmental Evaluation and Social
Choice, in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM, supra, at 531, 531-52.
3. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 197 (1999) (on the power of
participation in labor markets to increase some women’s sense of agency and autonomy);
Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a
Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 328 (2004) (on the power of a new mode
of production to increase the effective power of motives such as “love, status, and esteem”).
4. For the thought of two legal theorists who have focused on the alleged tendency of a
microeconomic account of choice to collapse into subjectivism and instrumentalism, blind to
qualitative distinctions in value, see GREGORY ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY:
COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970 1-4 (1997)
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actors’ self-interest includes their values, however they understand
those: motives need not be restricted to wealth or some other
“objective advantage,” nor must actors experience themselves as
“maximizing utility” or “maximizing preference-satisfaction,” rather
than pursuing values qua values. A dynamic analysis is distinctive,
however, in that it must take values seriously in a somewhat different
way from a static approach. In a dynamic analysis, values interact as
efforts at interpersonal persuasion and subjective insight: they
qualitatively influence the set of interests (including values – again, I
am not setting the terms in opposition to each other) that operates in
the next iteration of decision-making. Understanding this activity
may require an interpretive effort, an attempt to grasp the ways in
5
which persuasion occurs.
I. CLIMATE CHANGE AND MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY
The temporal and spatial scales of climate change might have
been designed to confound the basic operating principles of modern
political economy. Take the first principle of economic life: the idea,
made cliché in Adam Smith’s metaphor of the invisible hand, that
when individuals pursue their respective self-interest, their choices
6
will aggregate to maximize social welfare. This idea depends, of
course, on the premise that people take on – internalize, in the
preferred language – the benefits and harms that flow from their
decisions. Otherwise, externalities kick in: benefits and harms that do
7
not redound to those who create them. These may lead people to do
too few beneficial things, because they do not themselves get the full
benefit, or – what is salient here – too many harmful things, because
they need not absorb the full harm. This premise of economic life,
commonsensical though it can seem, is a defining principle of modern

(connecting the negative liberty secured by market property with an economically inflected
subjectivism of value); MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE
WITH TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS 79-102 (arguing that a
market logic of choice and valuation flattens qualitative moral distinctions and leads choosers to
view all things as instruments to satisfy their subjective preferences).
5. For a rigorous account of the distinctive commitments of a mode of social inquiry
committed to interpretation, see CHARLES TAYLOR, What Is Human Agency?, in HUMAN
AGENCY AND LANGUAGE 15, 15-44 (1985); CHARLES TAYLOR, Self-Interpreting Animals, in
HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE, supra, at 45, 45-76.
6. For the origins and ambiguities of this metaphor, see EMMA ROTHSCHILD, ECONOMIC
SENTIMENTS: ADAM SMITH, CONDORCET, AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT 116-56 (2001).
7. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1322-35 (1993)
(discussing the concept of externalities and legal responses thereto).
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civilization and quite distinct from the way earlier societies
8
understood economic order.
Climate change threatens to be, fairly literally, the externality
that ate the world. Within a year of emission, carbon dioxide is
uniformly distributed throughout the global atmosphere. Someone
who uses energy derived from fossil fuels gets the full benefit of that
power while evenly dividing the atmospheric harm with – at the time
9
of writing – somewhat more than 6.6 billion people. That is a ratio of
benefit to harm guaranteed to create overindulgence. (Imagine being
able to enjoy a certain elevation, giddiness, and self-confidence with
every drink you took, while distributing hangovers, weight gain,
chemical dependence, and impaired driving across the entire human
population. For a while we’d all be pretty giddy, excepting the
Mormons, and distilleries would do a booming business; but
eventually everybody else’s drinking would leave each of us
desperately dissolute.) When the aggregate result of externalitydriven overuse is potentially catastrophic climate change, the
principle of maximizing social welfare through individual maximizing
decisions has hit a tragic juncture, in which externalized harms
overwhelm internalized benefits.
The invisible hand premise of economic life has a
complementary political premise: when individual pursuit of selfinterest runs off the rails, political decisions to rearrange property
10
rights or otherwise regulate activity can correct the problem. The
paradigm cases of such political intervention are barring selfinterested activity that offends core moral sensibilities, such as
inducing others to enter contracts of enslavement or for the sale of
11
their organs, and correcting externalities.
Correcting greenhouse
gas externalities is not, technically speaking, all that difficult. Either a
tax on emissions of carbon dioxide and its heat-forcing equivalents or

8. For an illuminating discussion of the distinctness of this idea as an early-modern
innovation in the self-understanding of society, see CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 159-85
(2007).
9. According to the United Nations’ 2006 estimate, global population was a bit over 6.5
billion in 2005 and is estimated to reach just over 6.9 billion in 2010. See United Nations
Economic and Social Development, http://esa.un.org/unpp/p2k0data.asp (last visited Feb. 13,
2008).
10. See Ellickson, supra note 7 (discussing property regimes as instruments for managing
externalities); Jedediah Purdy, People as Resources: Recruitment and Reciprocity in the
Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property, 56 DUKE L.J. 1047, 1085-89 (2007) (discussing the
prohibition on enslavement as a premise of the modern property regime).
11. See Ellickson, supra note 7; see also Purdy, supra note 10.
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a cap-and-trade system could impose on emitters a monetary
12
expression of the otherwise externalized costs of their emissions.
This would reduce short-run demand and, more importantly, spur
investment in alternative energy sources and more efficient patterns
13
of energy use.
The difficulty is that political and legal decisions have their own
scales of space and time, which are not those of climate change.
Spatially, most effective political decisions occur at the scale of the
nation-state and its jurisdictional subdivisions. A truly global
problem reproduces for a nation the same problem of externalities as
for individuals: a national public must absorb the full cost of any
measure it adopts to address climate change, but will receive only a
fraction of the globally distributed benefit – a benefit, moreover, that
14
may be overwhelmed by others’ growing emissions. From the point
of view of a politician proposing measures to address climate change,
the proposal can resemble a massive foreign-aid project. A United
States policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, for instance, would
15
distribute 95 percent of its benefit to foreigners on a per capita basis.
National-level action is likely to be both politically unattractive and
environmentally ineffective for these reasons. The scale of a political
fix will have to be that of the problem: all the earth.
The problem is even worse on the global scale of coordinated
international action. The anticipated effects of climate change, while
highly uncertain, are quite diverse. Thus on some prominent
estimates, the United States would have been a massive net loser
from adopting the Kyoto Protocol, even with total global compliance,
because the costs of implementation would have been much greater
16
Some other
than the cost from unmitigated climate change.
countries, notably Russia, might be net gainers from climate change,
at least in the medium term, even without considering the costs of

12. For a sketch of the respective mechanisms and their advantages and disadvantages, see
William Chameides & Michael Oppenheimer, Carbon Trading over Taxes, 315 SCIENCE 1670
(2007).
13. For an argument that such a policy would ultimately prove cost-effective, see RICHARD
A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 155-65 (2004).
14. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate
Policies, 155 U. PENN L. REV. 1961, 1966-73 (2007) (setting out the functional disadvantages of
any sub-global effort to control climate change).
15. I base this on the United States’ share, 300 million, of the world population,
approximately six billion.
16. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 71-117 (2007).
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17

mitigation.
As Jonathan Wiener has pointed out, because the
decision rule for international treaties is consensus – that is, each
country’s consent is necessary to create a comprehensive regulatory
scheme – such diverse interests present a serious impediment to
18
creating an effective international regime. One might think that it
should be possible in principle to redistribute the benefits of climatechange mitigation by buying off reluctant countries, as Europe did for
19
Russia in inducing it to join Kyoto. This approach, though, presents
serious difficulties: strategic misrepresentation of anticipated national
interest, as countries jockey to be bought off; pure holdout problems,
even without such misrepresentation; disputes about acceptable
distributions of benefits and burdens, including politicized arguments
about international distributive justice; and, closely linked to the last,
domestic political reluctance to subsidize the mitigation efforts of
20
foreigners.
Even more basic, however, is the problem of temporal scale.
Each year’s greenhouse gas emissions commit the global atmosphere
to decades of resulting change, and the sum of atmospheric changes,
arising from interacting natural and anthropogenic influences, may
21
emerge over an even longer time. This means that the benefits of
mitigating climate change will accrue to future generations while the
living bear the costs. Domestic political decision-making, particularly
in democracies, is tied to electoral cycles ranging ordinarily from two
years (the United States House of Representatives) to seven (the
maximum period between United Kingdom parliamentary elections).
Within any political cycle, it is highly likely that the costs of a serious
17. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Designing Global Climate Regulation, in CLIMATE CHANGE
POLICY: A SURVEY 151, 160 (Stephen Schneider, Armin Rosencranz & John O. Niles eds.,
Island Press 2002).
18. See id. at 161-62, 166-67.
19. See id. at 169.
20. On competing approaches to international distributive justice in connection with
climate change, see PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION 14-51
(2002); Stephen M. Gardiner, Ethics and Global Climate Change, 114 ETHICS 555 (2004). On
the relevance of ideas of fairness to the American political debate over the Kyoto Protocol, see
Frank Luntz, The Environment: A Cleaner, Safer, Healthier America 137 (2002) (strategy
memo to the White House for Republican Party candidates), available at
http://www2.bc.edu/~plater/Newpublicsite06/suppmats/02.6.pdf (“The ‘international fairness’
issue is the emotional home run.”).
21. For a survey of the range of potential impacts, see INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL
SCIENCE BASIS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (S. Solomon et al. eds.,
2007).
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mitigation effort will outweigh the benefits. Moreover, the benefits
are unavoidably uncertain because so many elusive and perhaps
22
unanswerable questions attach to climate forecasting. Indeed, the
benefits are never knowable, because they are calculated in harms
that did not occur, relative to unavoidably speculative alternative
scenarios. A politician seeking constituent support for climatechange policy must make the case for present sacrifices in the interest
of future generations. Those beneficiaries are strangers to the
present generation that bears the cost – the future, like the past, is a
foreign country – and their benefits are unavoidably matters of
guesswork, both now and in the future.
It might seem, then, that climate change is the Achilles heel of
modern political economy, a problem whose spatial and temporal
scale produces overwhelming externalities and confounds political
efforts to address them. Literature concentrating on the difficulties I
have set out so far has suggested as much, though in less dramatic
23
terms. More popular commentators have described the issue as one
that calls into question the basic premises of our political and
24
economic life.
II. CLIMATE CHANGE AND POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY
So, a way of understanding economic and political decisions that
envisages people as rational in a microeconomic way – that is, as
maximizing their own self-interest – provides a set-piece of
pessimism. Of course, it is conceivable that people could be
motivated to address climate change if they were highly altruistic in
their motives, taking in both living foreigners and future generations;

22. See id. For treatments of some of the disastrous scenarios associated with climate
change, see POSNER, supra note 13, at 43-58; Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, An Abrupt
Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security (2003)
(unpublished paper commissioned by United States Department of Defense, on file with
author).
23. See, e.g., Wiener, supra note 14; SUNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 101-04. Recognizing the
difficulty presented by climate change under a static analysis, Sunstein has expressed increasing
interest in the role of moral considerations and dynamic analysis. See Cass R. Sunstein, The
Complex Climate Change Incentives of China and the United States 30-35 (2007) (unpublished
paper, on file with author).
24. See Anatol Lieven, The End of the West as We Know It?, INTERNATIONAL HERALD
TRIBUNE, Dec. 28, 2006; Albert Gore, Nobel Prize Lecture in Stockholm, Sweden (Dec. 10,
2007) (“Indeed, without realizing it, we have begun to wage war on the earth itself. Now, we and
the earth’s climate are locked in a relationship familiar to war planners: ‘Mutually assured
destruction.’”).
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25

but, generally speaking, they are not. If anything, conventional rates
of discounting for the value of future lives probably overstate the
willingness of the living to make concrete sacrifices now for the well26
Conventional rational behavior by
being of future generations.
individuals with representative values looks like a recipe for shared
disaster.
A similarly pessimistic picture emerges if we begin from a
different and complementary account of decision-making: the
psychological portrait of individuals’ persistent and patterned
deviation from microeconomic rationality. Ranged together under
labels such as “cognitive bias” and “behavioral economics,” these
deviations comprise ways in which individuals differentially assess
alternatives that, viewed according to some canon of rationality, are
not relevantly different. For instance, in assessing the importance of
a matter – say, the magnitude of risk associated with it or the urgency
of doing something about it – people overestimate greatly the
importance of phenomena that are salient, that is, readily available to
27
the mind. Salience is a cultural fact, often occasioned by a highly
visible event. For instance, terrorism acquired great salience as a
threat in the wake of September 11, 2001, with the result that
Americans not only ranked it very high among threats and problems
facing the country, but estimated their personal risk of suffering a
terrorist incident at a little over eight percent – a vast overstatement,
which would have more than 25 million Americans a year directly
28
Historically, environmental legislation has
affected by terrorism.
often been prompted by salience-producing incidents, such as the
burning of the Cuyahoga River, which contributed to the Clean
Water Act, and the discovery of toxins at Love Canal, which inspired
29
Superfund (CERCLA) legislation. So far, such salience-producing
events have been elusive for climate change, perhaps because the
relevant causal links are subtle and open to dispute. Hurricane
Katrina was horrific – enough so to make salient the impression that
the Bush Administration was incompetent and callously indifferent to

25. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 109-11.
26. On the moral considerations attending discounting, see id. at 244-74; Daniel Farber,
From Here to Eternity: Environmental Law and Future Generations, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 289
(2003); Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless, 150 U. PENN L. REV. 1553
(2002).
27. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 54-60.
28. See id. at 43.
29. See id. at 54-63.
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governance – but linking it to the IPCC’s general forecast of more
30
severe storms would have seemed like special pleading. The same
goes for droughts and hot summers: is any particular season evidence
of the general phenomenon of climate change? Purely speculative
images, such as the immersion of many coastal areas that many saw in
computer simulation in An Inconvenient Truth, seem to be received
31
as science fiction, or guesswork, not salient fact. It may be that the
mind’s appetite for salience demands specificity and causal
definiteness of a kind that a global and causally complex set of
changes does not provide. If so, that would be a considerable barrier
to getting political traction for the issue.
Consider another cognitive bias: people greatly value, and seek
32
to help or avenge, individual victims of wrongs. As the number of
33
victims multiplies, the value observers place on each one falls.
Asked to contribute to a humanitarian cause, respondents give much
more to help one victim whose face they are shown than in response
to a description of the general problem – say, a drought or political
34
oppression – that produces such victims. In fact, when shown the
victim’s face and given the general description, they give less than
35
when confronted with the face alone. Knowledge plus sympathy is
36
less motivationally powerful than sympathy uneducated. This is an
especially precise rendition of Stalin’s grim quip that while one death
37
is a tragedy, a million deaths are a statistic. Global climate change
may be, in Stalin’s sense, the ultimate statistic: too diffuse and
encompassing to concentrate moral attention in the way an individual
38
face can do.
Recent developments in public opinion around climate change
are consistent with this pattern. A growing share of poll respondents

30. See id. at 59-60.
31. AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH (Lawrence Bender Productions 2006).
32. See Paul Slovic, If I Look at the Mass, I Will Never Act: Psychic Numbing and
Genocide (unpublished paper, on file with author) (2006).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. While frequently attributed to Stalin, this grim remark is not reliably traceable to him.
See Wikiquote, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Joseph_Stalin#_note-statistics (last visited February
7, 2008).
38. A distinct but related phenomenon is the extra importance which people frequently
assign to problems identified with concrete and easily envisioned villains, such as Osama bin
Laden. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 65 (on the “Goldstein effect”).
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affirms that climate change is a real, human-caused problem and that
39
When, however,
something should be done to address it.
respondents are invited in an open-ended fashion to name the most
important challenges facing the country or the issues most important
to them, or when they are asked to rank a list of issues in importance,
40
climate change makes a weak showing. This is consistent with the
profile of an issue that has developed a good deal of credibility, but
not a lot of salience. An issue with this profile may not develop the
kind of committed constituency that will reward politicians for
pursuing it.
III. ANOMALIES OF CONVICTION
The appeal of the microeconomic account of rationality is its
supposed psychological realism: those who hold it are meant to be
41
free of illusion about what motivates people. The microeconomic
perspective has the weight of former Treasury Secretary and Harvard
University president Lawrence Summers’s much-invoked dictum that
no one in human history has ever washed a rented car, that is, that
people do not behave irrationally, even when it might be nice of them
42
to do so. A similar appeal attaches to accounts of cognitive bias:
this, and not some more ideally moral or rational model, describes the
messed-up human predicament.
The problem is that neither model can account for some of the
most important events in the history of value and decision-making,

39. See Thomas L. Brewer, Public Opinion on Climate Change Issues in the G8+5
Countries,
http://www.usclimatechange.com/downloads/PO%2520update%2520March%252015%2520200
7.doc (reporting movement in the share of respondents identifying climate change as a “very
serious problem” from just over 30% to just under 50% between 2003 and 2006). In 2006, 41%
of U.S. respondents said they believed climate change was caused by human activity. See New
Release, Pew Center of People and the Press, Little Consensus on Global Warming (July 12,
2006), available at http://people-press.org/reports/ display.php3?ReportID=280. In January,
2008, a CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll found 78% U.S. respondents claiming global
warming would be “extremely,” “very,” or “moderately” important in their choice of
candidates. See http://www.pollingreport.com/ prioriti.htm (last visited February 7, 2008).
40. Global warming did not show up in responses to an open-ended poll conducted by CBS
News in January, 2008, while only 6% of respondents to an NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll
in the same period chose “environment/global warming” as the most important of a list of
issues. Poll summaries available at http://www.pollingreport.com/prioriti.htm (last visited
February 7, 2008).
41. See Dan. M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and the Law,
102 MICH L. REV. 71, 102 (2003) (making this observation).
42. See http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/l/lawrence_summers.html (last visited
February 13, 2008).
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including events particularly relevant to the politics of climate change.
For instance, the 1838 act of Parliament that abolished slavery
throughout the British Empire has confounded generations of
scholarly attempts to explain it as an expression of economic selfinterest, whether of the Empire in relation to competitors or of
43
interest groups within the Empire. David Brion Davis, the foremost
living scholar of slavery, has concluded that British abolition
amounted to self-administered “econocide,” a devastating blow to the
44
imperial economy, and that Britons well understood this. To take
another example, while the microeconomic theory of rationality
predicts that public officials will always seek to maximize the
resources and power of their branch of government, a recent,
comprehensive study of United States executive branch practice
shows that this is not so: for many decades, presidents and their
representatives did not assert certain technically colorable claims of
45
constitutional prerogative against the legislative branch. They were
certainly capable of imagining and making those arguments; but they
did not.
Switching from microeconomic rationality to cognitive-bias
theories of political psychology, we once again find critical and
relevant events that confound the conventional account. Here the
problem is one of question-begging. What determines the meaning of
a salient event?
Take the burning of the Cuyahoga.
The
conflagration that preceded the Clean Water Act was not the first
time the river had burned, but earlier events had not inspired a
46
perception of environmental crisis. Moreover, viewed as if by an
anthropologist from another culture, it is not self-evident that a
burning river is a symptom of environmental crisis, rather than an
entertaining side-benefit of an industrial economy – like Teflon and
the space program, but more fun to watch. For this to be the meaning
of the burning river, a whole series of earlier exercises in persuasion
had to occur, including John Muir’s Romantic evocation of an
unspoiled American nature as a redemptive counterpoint to industrial

43. See DAVID BRION DAVIS, Explanations of British Abolitionism, in INHUMAN
BONDAGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SLAVERY IN THE NEW WORLD 231, 231-49 (2006).
44. See id.
45. See David Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief Power at the
Lowest Ebb – A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 952 (2008) (so stating, noting
that the historical fact contradicts much commonplace supposition).
46. See TED NORDHAUS & MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER, BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE
DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY 22-24 (2007).
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society and Rachel Carson’s image of a world poisoned by human
47
These drew in turn on long traditions of moral
misjudgment.
rhetoric and imagery, notably literary Romanticism for Muir and the
48
apocalyptic tradition for Carson. There is no such thing as a natural
neurological fact called salience, which leads the brain to fire signals
of moral distress upon certain highly visible events; rather, the moral
valence of salient events, and perhaps even their salience itself, is a
49
cultural fact formed by traditions of argument. This is true even in
some measure of such deep patterns as the moral-psychological
importance of individuals and their faces. We learn, assuredly, to
regard the faces and lives of those different from us as signifying less
human value than those like our own, or we learn to regard them as
50
equally important.
Of course, one might say that the complaint against the
microeconomic-rationality approach is that it also begs the question.
As noted in the Introduction, the kinds of motives that led Parliament
to abolish slavery and American presidents to refrain from indefinite
claims of executive power can be perfectly well modeled as “selfinterest”: the formal microeconomic model of rationality implies no
substantive view of what people can be expected to value. Here,
however, the model is no use in making sense of policy decisions
unless it involves some substantive premises. Even as basic a concept
as externalities depends on what counts as a harm and what a benefit,
that is, what the relevant actor values. Someone with perfectly
altruistic preferences would not regard a selfless decision to give up
fossil fuels as producing a positive externality; instead, he would
understand himself as receiving the full benefit of the choice by the
very act of benefiting others. An externality is not a natural fact,
unless people’s preferences are natural facts. The earlier, very
standard analysis of externalities’ role in climate-change politics
smuggled in the reasonable premise that people’s motives

47. See RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962); JOHN MUIR, MY FIRST SUMMER IN THE
SIERRA (1911).
48. On the Romantic roots of John Muir’s work, see RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND
THE AMERICAN MIND 122-40 (2001). On Carson’s debt to the apocalyptic tradition in literature
and rhetoric, see M. Jimmie Killingsworth & Jacqueline S. Palmer, Millennial Ecology: The
Apocalyptic Narrative from Silent Spring to Global Warming, in GREEN CULTURE:
ENVIRONMENTAL RHETORIC IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 21, 21-45 (Carl G. Herndl &
Stuart C. Brown eds.,1996).
49. I discuss this point in greater detail in Jedediah Purdy, The Promise (and Limits) of
Neuroeconomics, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1, 21-40 (2006).
50. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 150-60.
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prominently, if not exhaustively, comprise their economic selfinterest. The lesson of the historical counter-examples is that this is
not always the whole story, and that the rest of the story – the
additional motives that drive superficially counter-intuitive decisions,
or fill in the cultural meanings of salience – are historically and
culturally particular. They change. To understand past decisions and
the prospects of future ones, therefore, it is important to understand
these motives and to begin to appreciate how they change.
IV. MORAL MOTIVES
Let’s engage values qualitatively, not as the homogenous “warm
glow” that theorists sometimes add in to their utility calculus to
account for anomalies, but as distinctive motives that may operate
51
differently in different contexts. At least three related but distinct
clusters of motive operate here – and there are certainly others, such
as sympathy, which I won’t take up right now. One is righteousness,
52
the desire to be on the side of justice. This works on the level of
identity, and is expressed through such declarations as “I am not a
racist,” “I wouldn’t work for Blackwater,” or “I don’t perform
abortions.” Such considerations figure all the time in choices of
career, political contributions (it is impossible to explain hundreds of
thousands of small-denomination contributions in simple publicchoice terms, as individual attempts to purchase desired policy
outcomes), participation in charity and civic life, and so forth. One of
David Brion Davis’s conclusions about British abolitionism is simply
that millions of Britons had come to believe slavery profoundly
53
wrong, and they wanted no part of it. That changed the balance of
their preferences, because the desire to be right, when the alternative
is a cataclysmic wrong, can overwhelm material self-interest. Indeed,
it is probably time to drop the concession to microeconomic language
and follow the economics Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen in insisting
that calling every motive to choice a “preference” is a little too flat
and generic: preferences, values, and commitments are distinct,
54
though closely related, drivers of choice.

51. For an example of the tendency to lump such motives into a residual category, see
Kirsten Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives for State and Local Climate Change
Initiatives, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 119 (2008).
52. For a discussion of moral identity as a motivational factor, see JONATHAN GLOVER,
HUMANITY: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 26-30 (2001).
53. See DAVIS, supra note 43, at 245-47.
54. See SEN, supra note 2, at 206-24.
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A second moral motive is protecting dignity, the qualities,
generally close to the core of one’s identity, that command respect.
Not surprisingly, experimental economics shows that people will give
up considerable cash rewards to punish others who have tried to
55
“short” them or otherwise failed to show them respect. Note that
these findings are in the heartland of conventional economic selfinterest, spot transactions in which the alternative choices are defined
purely in monetary amounts, though in some cases accepting the
larger amount involves also accepting a measure of disrespect.
Davis’s interpretation of British abolitionism places dignity near
the heart of the relevant motives. He argues that a new register of
personal dignity among the working and middle classes of Britain, the
56
ideal of “free labor,” drove an abhorrence of slavery. The free-labor
ideal held that a laborer, craftsman, or smallholder who chose his own
employment – in modern terms, either a labor-market participant or a
yeoman – had a special dignity arising from self-ownership and
57
autonomy. What made free labor “free” was always defined in part
58
by the counterpoint of slavery. In Davis’s view, new social classes in
Britain drove the Empire to “econocide” because the imperial slave
economy was anathema to their identities and sense of dignity. To
return briefly to my other historical example, presidential power and
the self-restraint of many executives: historian Gordon Wood
concludes that a vision of “republican” dignity, in which an honorable
man sought power not for its own sake but for the public good, was
59
the source of early precedents for executive restraint. Executives
did not behave as certain conventional models of rationality predict,
not because it would not have occurred to them to do so, but because
grabbing the maximum of power would have been a break with their
own identities and a self-inflicted insult.
A third relevant moral motive is reciprocity. When people
decide whether to participate in or defect from a scheme of
cooperation, either in a small-numbers game or in a society-wide
55. See Purdy, supra note 49, at 10-13.
56. See DAVIS, supra note 43, at 246-49.
57. See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 1-37 (1970) (describing the premises and social
vision of free-labor thought).
58. See id. at 11-13 (describing the basic tenets of free-labor thought and its defining
contrast with the slave system of the antebellum South).
59. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 205-06
(1992) (on the idea of civic honor as a motive in George Washington’s decisions in the early
Republic).
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practice such as voting or paying taxes, they are much more likely to
60
cooperate if they believe others are doing so as well. Studies suggest
that for most people, reciprocal cooperation is a basic form of
satisfaction, connected with positive social reinforcement and
61
Those who try to cooperate and meet
interpersonal recognition.
with defection in others, by contrast, feel slighted, and like suckers,
62
and they hurry to defect themselves. The ideal of free labor was
also an ideal of reciprocity, a vision of social order as governed by the
voluntary agreements and reciprocal negotiation of autonomous yet
63
interdependent individuals.
V. CLIMATE CHANGE, ATMOSPHERIC AND POLITICAL
With all this in mind, we can return to climate change with
sharper vision. What follows from what I’ve set out here? First, we
should understand the politics around climate change – in elections
and other political forums, but also in the broader cultural debate – as
an attempt to work out how the issue relates to some of our basic
moral motives. One question in play is whether we can develop a
moral vision of global ecology that will power value-based decisions
by people whose identity and dignity involve doing the right thing by
the planet. We know that is not just airy talk – not necessarily,
anyway – because it has been a precondition of our politics around
other environmental issues, such as water pollution and open-lands
64
conservation.
There are already signs of such a thing in states’,
65
regions’, and municipalities’ adopting climate-change measures.
Seen in the light of conventional self-interest, these decisions are
paradigms of futility, almost caricatures of the problems of scale that I
66
outlined earlier – as if Salt Lake City could affect the global climate!
Seen as part of working out moral motives whose form is partly
endogenous to politics, they are both efforts to be on the right side of
a global crisis and proposals about what it means to do the right thing
in relation to climate change. They are intended to “scale up,” not

60. See Kahan, supra note 41, at 75-85.
61. See id. at 73-74.
62. See id. at 75-99.
63. See Purdy, supra note 10, at 1083-85.
64. See supra note 47-49 and accompanying text.
65. See Engel & Orbach, supra note 51, at 3-7 (setting out local climate initiatives).
66. For a list of cities that have (at least nominally) committed to meeting Kyoto Protocol
goals locally, including Salt Lake City, see http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/
ClimateChange.asp (last visited February 13, 2008).
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just as policy models in the laboratory of democracy, but as
imperatives for a responsible polity. Policies can themselves be
efforts at persuasion, and these seem to fall into that category.
Second, economic activity can also be an effort at moral
persuasion and training moral attitudes. For the advocates of free
labor, slave societies reproduced themselves by training their
members to identify with hierarchy and subordination, while free
economic relations taught people to approach one another with
67
By comparison, every aspect of the
respect and forbearance.
current economy reflects and reinforces the expectation that
greenhouse gas emissions are costless, from non-dense housing and
transport patterns to energy-inefficient architecture. Local climate
policies and individual decisions such as buying carbon offsets are
efforts to create the opposite expectation, to model an economy that
would be relentlessly oriented toward taking account of the harms of
emissions. Adopting national legislation that put a price on such
emissions, either by tax or by cap-and-trade, would affect static
judgments about the relative costs and benefits of consumption and
investment decisions; but it would also dynamically affect attitudes
about what is a morally appropriate economy. Such attitudes, in turn,
affect the prospect of every nation passing such legislation. This,
then, leads to a third point: economic and political decisions will be
mutually reinforcing in the developing debate about climate change.
Finally, there is an unavoidable argument about what counts as
reciprocity in climate policy. The failure of the Kyoto Protocol in the
United States had importantly to do with a conception of fairness:
that for the United States to take on mitigation costs while major
developing-country emitters do not would make American taxpayers
68
suckers in a non-reciprocal global scheme. A very different sense of
fairness, however, is at work in some developing countries, such as
India, where the conventional view is that because rich countries
contributed most of the current anthropogenic atmospheric carbon, it
would make suckers of developing countries to ask them now to take
on the costs of mitigating a problem whose benefits have flowed
69
mostly to generations of rich Europeans and Americans. Any global

67. See Purdy, supra note 10.
68. See Luntz, supra note 20.
69. For a discussion of this issue in international distributive terms, see SINGER, supra note
20, at 27-34. For an account of developing-country perspectives on the question, see LAVANYA
RAJAMANII, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 216-36
(2006).
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climate accord will have to overcome conventional forms of
collective-action problems; but it will also have to contend with this
difference in ideas of what would count as a scheme of reciprocity.
Success on this front will not just mediate among existing ideas of
reciprocity, but revise those ideas going forward. (I do not mean, by
the way, that there will have to be consensus on this issue, or that
values rather than material interests will be the main drivers of an
agreement, just that the terms of any possible agreement, and what
will be required for successful implementation, will both depend on
and affect how people in relevant countries understand fairness and
reciprocity in climate change.) One challenge in the climate debate is
whether it is possible to develop a shared, or at least overlapping,
view of the appropriate distribution of environmental benefits and
burdens among nations and across generations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sometimes, impossibility really is impossibility. At other times, it
is potential that has not yet become real. A short list of things
thought impossible by the best minds of previous centuries includes
some of the axioms of present life: racial and sexual equality, orderly
democracy, and economies based on individual choice and selfinterest. These were the wild-eyed utopian dreams of other times, set
against widely shared assumptions about human nature and
70
institutional limits. Two of those onetime utopian dreams, markets
and democracy, are now sources of our own sense of limitation, our
reasons for suspecting that climate change may be insurmountable.
At the same time, viewed dynamically, they are among the places
where we may develop new ideas about our preferences, values, and
commitments, which could anchor a response to climate change.
Climate change demands as much technical expertise, and as
broad a range of it, as any problem in history. Natural science,
engineering, economics, the fine points of institutional design, are all
front-and-center and will remain there. Nonetheless, the problem is
more than technical. Technical solutions will interact with developing
ideas about what is right, fair, and dignified. Success will mean
moving outward the limits of the possible.
70. For early-modern arguments that democratic self-rule and market-based economic
order would lead inevitably to anarchy, see Extract from the Debates at Putney, in THE ENGLISH
LEVELLERS 102, 102-30 (Andrew Sharp ed., 1998). I trace the fate of some of the ideas in
JEDEDIAH PURDY, A TOLERABLE ANARCHY: FREEDOM AND COMMUNITY IN AMERICAN LIFE
(forthcoming 2009).

